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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890226-CA 
v. : 
ADREN RAY WARNER, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
B R I E F O F R E S P O N D E N T 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), following a trial to 
the bench in Third District Court, in and for Summit County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, judge, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction in this case under Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the amount of methamphetamine found on a 
vial in defendant's possession was sufficient to sustain a 
conviction of possession of a controlled substance, and whether 
methamphetamine found in the vehicle in which defendant was a 
passenger at the time of arrest was the product of a 
constitutional search. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37*8(2) — Prohibited acts — Penalties! 
(a) It is unlawful: (i) for any person 
knowingly and intentionally to possess or 
use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or 
order or directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of his profes-
sional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this subsection; 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to . . . (ii) a 
substance classified in Schedule I or II, or 
marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty 
of a third degree felony; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Adren Ray Warner, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). He was convicted 
as charged following a bench trial on February 10, 1989, in Third 
District Court, Summit County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
presiding. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison. Imposition of the sentence 
was suspended and defendant was placed on parole. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 29, 1988, defendant was a passenger in an 
automobile being driven by Vickie Courtney (T. 12). A highway 
patrolman, Trooper Simpson, pulled over the vehicle for a speeding 
violation on Interstate-80 in Summit County (T. 8,9). During the 
course of issuing the citation, Trooper Simpson noticed a twelve-
pack of beer on the floor beneath defendant's legs (T. 13). He 
went around to the passenger side of the car and requested the 
beer (T. 13). Upon opening the door, he noticed a cold cup 
holding an open can of beer wedged between the passenger seat and 
the door (T. 14). Trooper Simpson requested defendant's 
identification and issued him a citation for the open container of 
alcohol (T. 14). During a local warrants check, he found that 
there was an outstanding warrant for defendant from the Summit 
County Circuit Court (T. 15). Defendant was taken into custody 
and taken to the Summit County jail (T. 15). Ms. Courtney was 
free to leave but voluntarily chose to follow defendant to the 
jail (T. 16). 
During the course of the booking search, Trooper 
Simpson found a brown vial with a white powdery substance caked 
around the lip in the front pocket of defendant's shirt (T. 16-
17). Defendant initially denied any knowledge about the brown 
vial (T. 23). Based upon his observation of similar types of 
vials, Trooper Simpson believed the vial to contain cocaine (T. 
18). 
After discovering the vial, Trooper Simpson determined 
that there was probable cause to search Ms. Courtney's vehicle 
based upon the following: defendant was riding in the vehicle at 
the time it was pulled over; defendant cohabitated with Ms. 
Courtney and therefore was not just a temporary passenger; and, in 
Trooper Simpson's previous experience, it was common, after 
finding a controlled substance on a person, to find additional 
controlled substance in the vehicle (T. 19, 106). Defendant's 
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initial denial of knowledge of the vial in his shirt pocket added 
to the level of concern (T. 23). Trooper Simpson went outside and 
informed Ms. Courtney that he was going to search the vehicle (T. 
18). During the course of this search/ Trooper Simpson searched 
defendant's jacket and found a razor scraper/ called a Widget/ 
with a white paper bindle tucked into the edge (T. 20). Trooper 
Simpson opened the bindle and found it contained a white/ powdery 
substance (T. 21). Defendant denied knowledge of the bindlef and 
claimed that he had lent the jacket to a friend who might have 
left the bindle in his jacket (T. 23/ 112-114/ 120-122). 
The vial and the bindle were taken to the crime lab for 
analysis. The crusted white substance on the vial and the powdery 
substance in the bindle were both found to be methamphetamine, a 
Schedule II controlled substance (T. 60/ 64r 171). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant was properly convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance, methamphetamine/ which was seized during a 
booking search. Defendant does not contest the booking search or 
the subsequent seizure? of the brown vial/ located in his shirt 
pocket. The amount of the controlled substance was relatively 
small, and consisted of methamphetamine caked around the top of 
the vial. Nevertheless, the amount was sufficient to be 
identified during analysis. Whether the amount was usable or 
would result in a physical reaction is not the test; the 
determinative factor is possession of the controlled substance. 
Defendant was also in possession of a second source of 
methamphetamine. After the booking search during which the 
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initial substance was found, the trooper searched the car in 
which defendant was a passenger. The search, made pursuant to 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, revealed 
methamphetamine in defendant's coat pocket. Defendant claims 
that the seizure was the result of an unconstitutional search. 
Even if his contention were correct, the conviction must be 
sustained based upon his possession of the controlled substance 
brown vial, therefore, this court need not consider the validity 
of the search of the automobile. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
METHAMPHETAMINE, WHICH WAS PRESENT ON A VIAL 
SEIZED DURING A BOOKING SEARCH THAT DEFENDANT 
CONCEDES WAS VALID; ADDITIONAL METHAM-
PHETAMINE WAS PROPERLY SEIZED DURING A 
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE IN WHICH 
HE WAS A PASSENGER. 
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) which 
provides that it is unlawful "for any person knowingly and 
intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance . . . ." 
He was found to be in possession of two separate sources of 
methamphetamine: first, a vial which was found on his person 
during the course of a booking search pursuant to a valid arrest; 
second, a bindle found in his jacket pursuant to a search of the 
car in which he was riding at the time of arrest. Defendant seeks 
reversal based on two arguments. First, he contends that the 
warrantless search of the car was not constitutionally valid and 
the methamphetamine found during the course of this search was 
.5. 
inadmissible as evidence. Second, he contends that the amount of 
methamphetamine found on the vial located in his pocket during the 
booking search was insufficient to sustain a conviction of 
possession. 
Defendant's second argument, that the amount of the 
controlled substance was insufficient to sustain his conviction, 
clearly contradicts Utah case law. In point II of his brief he 
argues that the amount of methamphetamine found on the vial, which 
he admits was the product of a legal search, was insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of possession. His argument seems to be that 
since the statute does not specify the quantity of controlled 
substance a person must possess to sustain a conviction, the 
amount of controlled substance possessed must be a usable amount. 
This position is clearly erroneous in light of this Court's 
decision in State v. Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, 875 
(1964), where the Court found: 
[The] contention that the trial court erred 
in refusing to instruct the jury that, in 
order to convict, the amount of narcotic drug 
possessed must be found to be usable has no 
merit. The determinative test is possession 
of a narcotic drug, and not usability of a 
narcotic drug. 
See also State v. Forrester, 29 Or.App. 409, 564 P.2d 289, 291 
(1977) (the gravamen of the offense is unlawful possession 
without regard to quantity); Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273, 280 
(Alaska 1971) (it is not necessary that a usable quantity be 
possessed so long as the amount is sufficient to allow analysis). 
Although the amount of methamphetamine on the brown vial was 
small, there was a sufficient amount to conduct the laboratory 
analysis, with enough left over to likely conduct a second 
analysis (T. 67). The trial court correctly ruled that the 
methamphetamine found on the vial, which defendant concedes was 
in his possession and legally seized, was sufficient to sustain 
the conviction. 
Consideration of defendant's first contention, that the 
methamphetamine found in the bindle was the product of an illegal 
search, becomes unnecessary as the methamphetamine on the vial is 
sufficient to sustain the conviction. Should the Court decide to 
consider this issue, defendant's argument on this point also 
fails. Defendant's argument seems to be threefold: first, the 
search was not incident to a valid arrest; second, the trooper 
did not have probable cause to search the car; and third, even if 
the trooper had probable cause, there were not exigent 
circumstances to justify a warrantless search. 
The United States Supreme Court formulated the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement in Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). More recently, in California 
v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985), the Court reviewed the 
exception and noted that the rule was originally based upon the 
readily movable nature of automobiles, citing Carroll. Over the 
years, the Court developed an additional basis for the exception. 
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the Court 
emphasized that one has a significantly lesser expectation of 
privacy in an automobile than one has in a home or office. The 
lesser expectation of privacy does not derive only from the fact 
that the interior of a vehicle is usually in plain view, but also 
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from the fact that there is pervasive government regulation of 
vehicles. 
I n
 State v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405, 503 P.2d 848 
(1972), this Court considered Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 
(1970), relied upon by defendant. In Shields, the defendant took 
$500.00 from a cash drawer behind the counter of a store in 
Fillmore. A description of the defendant was given to police in 
adjoining towns, and the defendant was arrested in Parowan. The 
driver of the vehicle in which defendant was riding was not 
arrested, but he followed to the police station. Since the 
driver was not mentioned in the police bulletin he was allowed to 
leave, but was subsequently detained by police. His vehicle was 
taken to the police station where it was searched without a 
warrant. Defendant sought to suppress the evidence found during 
this search. 
The Shields Court, relying on Maroney, found that "a 
search of a vehicle on probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly 
different from that justifying a search incident to an arrest. 
The right to search and the validity of a seizure . . . are 
dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for the 
belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the 
law.M Ici. at 849. The crux of the issues raised by defendant in 
the instant case turn on whether the arresting officer had 
probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband. 
A "warrantless vehicle search is not invalid under the 
Fourth Amendment if probable cause for a search exists." State 
v. DorBey# 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). 
Probable cause exists where "the facts and 
circumstances within [the officer's] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that" an offense has 
been or is being committed. 
(Citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).) 
The determination of whether probable cause 
exists, therefore, depends upon an 
examination of all the information available 
to the searching officer in light of the 
circumstances as they existed at the time the 
search was made. The trial court's findings 
as to the facts and circumstances pertaining 
to probable cause will not be overturned on 
appeal unless it appears that the trial court 
clearly erred. 
Dorsey at 1088. 
The facts of this case indicate that the trial court 
was justified in finding that the trooper had probable cause to 
believe that the vehicle contained contraband. Defendant was 
riding in the vehicle when he was arrested. During a routine 
search of defendant's person at the police station, a small brown 
vial, with a white powdery substance encrusted on the lip, which 
the trooper thought to be cocaine, was found in his shirt pocket. 
The trooper testified that in his experience, five or six times 
within the previous few years, it was common to find additional 
controlled substances within the vehicle after finding a 
controlled substance on the person. The trooper also testified 
that he believed that defendant had certain property rights in 
the vehicle beyond that of a typical passenger, as defendant and 
the driver of the vehicle were living together as common law 
husband and wife. Defendant also initially denied knowledge of 
the existence of the vial on his person. Based on these facts, 
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this Court should uphold the trial court's finding that the 
trooper had probable cause to search the vehicle. 
The Shields Court also held that H[i]n exigent 
circumstances, the judgment of a police officer as to probable 
cause will serve as sufficient authorization for a search," Id. 
at 849. In Shields, the search was carried out after the driver 
of the vehicle had been detained and was in police custody. In 
the instant case the exigent circumstances were even greater, as 
the driver of the vehicle was not in police custody nor had the 
automobile been seized. The Court stated that Mfor 
constitutional purposes, there is no difference between seizing 
and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a 
magistrate and carrying out an immediate search without a 
warrant. Given probable cause, either course is ireasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment. . . . " Ld. at 849, 850. 
Based on the above principles this Court should find 
that the search of the automobile was constitutional since the 
trooper had probable cause to believe that the automobile 
contained contraband, and, based on this belief, was justified in 
conducting the search without first obtaining a warrant. 
Regardless, defendant's conviction is supported by his separate 
possession of methamphetamine contained in the brown vial. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Adren Ray Warner, was properly convicted 
of possession of a controlled substance. For the foregoing 
reasons, and any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the 
State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this f ] ' day of September, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
I BARBARA BEARNS^ 
Assi/stant Attorney General 
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